Paper looks into Crozat’s Gettier-type case that supposedly shows how pain-beliefs are not Gettier-proof proof and thus subject to fallibility

In this paper, “Are Pain-Beliefs Gettier Proof,” we respond to an argument presented by Eliott Crozat. In ‘The Case of Patient Smith: Pain-Belief, Epistemic Luck, and Acquaintance,’ Elliott Crozat challenged the infallibility of the belief that “I feel pain” by providing a Gettier-type example that shows that such a pain-belief can be fallibly justified and luckily true. Gettier-type cases originated from Edmund Gettier’s work, which challenged the conceptual definition of knowledge. We claim that this move is problematic given that the case is not the Gettier sort. To demonstrate this, we first question the causal relation or lack thereof between the subject’s pain-belief and the pain he felt. We argue that this leads us to a dilemma. Either the pain-belief and the pain are causally connected or not. If there is a causal connection, the subject’s true belief is justified, not epistemically lucky, and therefore qualifies as knowledge. If we grant no causal connection, we show that this leads to either an unjustified pain-belief or a justified false one. The result of both horns shows that Crozat’s Gettier-type example does not qualify as a bona fide Gettier case.

The work is significant because it contributes to the long-standing debate regarding the analysis of knowledge. Since 1963, philosophers and epistemologists have been trying to define knowledge. These discussions were ignited by Edmund Gettier’s brief but monumental paper, which challenged the tripartite analysis of knowledge, which claims that knowledge is conceptually defined as a justified and true belief. Our work extends these discussions to our beliefs about pain. Multiple epistemological works on knowledge and pain show that our beliefs about pain are self-presenting. That is, we cannot be wrong about knowing them. More recently, Crozat offered an argument against this, showing that we can apply Gettier’s argument to pain-beliefs. In addition, this work is significant because it touches on multiple facets of discussions related to psychology, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and others.

Authors: Mark Anthony L. Dacela (De La Salle University) and Kurt Christian B. Tubera (Department of Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman)

Read the full paper: https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202516216

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